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UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATES AND STATE JUDICIARIES: 
A QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY 
 
Justice Christine M. Durham* & Brian L. Hazen** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In our constitutional republic, sovereignty is divided between the centralized 
national government and the state governments. As the scope of the federal 
government’s authority expands, however, there is constant tension arising from 
federal encroachment into areas traditionally regulated by the states. When this 
encroachment occurs, it sometimes threatens to disrupt the deliberate balance of 
power created to ensure that local concerns are addressed by local government 
authorities. One area of historically local concern that has been subject to recent 
federal scrutiny is state judiciaries’ obligations and efforts to provide individuals 
with limited English proficiency (“LEP individuals”) meaningful access to state 
courts through the provision of court interpreters.1 
Although this is largely a matter of local state judicial administration, it may 
in some cases implicate federal statutory protections against national origin 
discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Civil Rights 
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has interpreted the federal 
regulations under Title VI to authorize the imposition of detailed and 
comprehensive federal LEP mandates on state judiciaries. As detailed below, these 
federal mandates require state judiciaries to provide free court interpreters in an 
extremely broad range of state court services, regardless of the LEP individual’s 
ability to pay. Moreover, DOJ has made clear that if state courts fail to voluntarily 
                                                     
* © 2014 Justice Christine M. Durham. Justice Durham has been on the Utah 
Supreme Court since 1982, and served as Chief Justice from 2002 to 2012. She has been 
recognized nationally for her work in judicial education and efforts to improve the 
administration of justice. In 2007, she received the William H. Rehnquist Award for 
Judicial Excellence; in 2008 she received the “Transparent Courthouse” Award for 
contributions to the judicial accountability and administration from the Institute for the 
Advancement of the Legal System. In September 2012, Justice Durham received the Eighth 
Annual Dwight D. Opperman Award for Judicial Excellence from the American Judicature 
Society. Special thanks to all of the Symposium participants for their engaging and 
thoughtful contributions, and to the entire Utah Law Review staff for their helpful 
comments on this piece.  
** © 2014 Brian L. Hazen. J.D., 2013, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. Law Clerk to Justice Christine Durham.  
1 LEP individuals are those who do not speak English as their primary language and 
who have a limited ability to read, speak, write, or understand English. See Guidance to 
Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National 
Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,834, 
3,834 (Jan. 16, 2001). 
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comply with these federal standards, they may face withdrawal of potentially all of 
their federal funding and expose themselves to civil litigation.  
But the question arises whether the federal government, consistent with the 
principles of federalism, has the legal authority under Title VI to coerce states to 
adopt specific court rules regarding court interpreters, and to require states to 
provide these interpreters entirely at the states’ expense. As discussed below, the 
legal footing upon which the federal government justifies this sweeping authority 
is not firmly established. This Essay will outline the federalism concerns 
surrounding the LEP mandate and will examine how particular state judiciaries are 
responding to what is arguably federal encroachment on state sovereignty. This 
Essay examines the idea that the best way to avoid ceding sovereignty to the 
federal government on this issue is for state judiciaries to undertake a collaborative 
defense against unfunded federal mandates to the extent they threaten to upset the 
proper balance of power inherent in American federalism.  
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
In August 2000, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13166, which 
required federal agencies to create and implement plans to ensure that LEP 
individuals would have meaningful access to federally funded services.2 These 
plans were to cover not only the provision of services by the agencies themselves, 
but also services provided by those agencies’ federal-fund recipients, including 
state agencies. To assist federal agencies in developing LEP guidance, the 
Executive Order incorporated by reference the contemporaneously issued DOJ 
General Policy Guidance,3 and instructed each federal agency, including DOJ, to 
issue specific LEP guidance consistent with the General Policy Guidance 
provisions.4 In 2002, DOJ issued its own agency-specific guidance to DOJ grant 
recipients, including state courts.5 In essence, this guidance required state courts to 
take reasonable steps “to ensure meaningful access to their programs and activities 
by” LEP persons.6 
                                                     
2 Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121 (Aug. 11, 2000). 
3 Id.; see also Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title 
VI Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English 
Proficient Persons, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,834.  
4 Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121, 50,121. 
5 See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI 
Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient 
Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,455, 41,459 (June 18, 2002). 
6 Id. at 41,455. The “meaningful access” analysis was designed to be a flexible, fact-
dependent standard which balances the following four factors:  
 
(1) The number or proportion of LEP persons eligible to be served or likely to 
be encountered by the program or grantee; (2) the frequency with which LEP 
individuals come in contact with the program; (3) the nature and importance of 
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The underlying basis for the Executive Order is the prohibition of national 
origin discrimination set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.7 The 
Executive Order and DOJ guidance documents clarify the federal government’s 
longstanding view that, in certain circumstances, regulations implementing Title 
VI require recipients of federal financial assistance to provide language assistance 
to LEP persons in order to avoid potential discrimination on the basis of national 
origin.8  
In the decade following the Executive Order, state court systems sought to 
improve their capacity to handle cases and other matters involving LEP parties or 
witnesses. Yet, in spite of those efforts, in 2010 DOJ sent a letter to chief justices 
and state court administrators in which it renewed its commitment to enforce the 
Executive Order against state judiciaries due to perceived systemic noncompliance 
with the federal government’s interpretation of Title VI.9 In that letter, Assistant 
Attorney General Thomas Perez acknowledged state courts’ progress with respect 
to the provision of court interpreters, but noted that DOJ continually 
“encounter[ed] state court language access policies or practices that are 
inconsistent with federal civil rights requirements.”10 Mr. Perez noted areas of 
particular concern and provided as “clarification” new mandatory requirements to 
which courts would be required to adhere in order to comply with the previously 
issued “meaningful access” requirement under federal law.11  
The scope of these new obligations is staggering. According to DOJ, 
“meaningful access” now required that state courts provide free interpreters to all 
LEP persons, regardless of the individual’s ability to pay, “including non-party 
LEP individuals whose presence or participation in a court matter is necessary or 
appropriate” in “all court and court-annexed proceedings, whether civil, criminal, 
or administrative including those presided over by non-judges,” and “court-
managed offices, operations, and programs,” including “information counters[,] 
intake or filing offices[,] cashiers[,] records rooms[,] sheriff’s offices[,] probation 
and parole offices[,] alternative dispute resolution programs[,] pro se clinics[,] 
                                                     
the program, activity, or service provided by the program to people’s lives; and 
(4) the resources available to the grantee/recipient and costs. 
 
Id. at 41,459. In doing so, DOJ ostensibly sought a balance that ensured meaningful access 
for LEP individuals while not imposing undue financial hardships on state courts. See id. 
Indeed, DOJ recognized that “[s]maller recipients with more limited budgets are not 
expected to provide the same level of language services as larger recipients with larger 
budgets” and that “‘reasonable steps’ may cease to be reasonable where the costs imposed 
substantially exceed the benefits.” Id. at 41,460. 
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). 
8 Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Chief 
Justices and State Court Adm’rs (Aug. 16, 2010), available at http://www.lep.gov/final_co 
urts_ltr_081610.pdf. 
9 See id. 
10 Id. at 1. 
11 Id. 
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criminal diversion programs[,] anger management classes[, and] detention 
facilities,” as well as during meetings with any “individuals who are employed, 
paid, or supervised by the courts,” including “[c]riminal defense counsel, child 
advocates or guardians ad litem, court psychologists, probation officers, doctors, 
[and] trustees.”12  
In response to DOJ’s new “meaningful access” interpretation, the Conference 
of Chief Justices (CCJ) and the Conference of State Court Administrators 
(COSCA) (jointly referred to as “the Conferences”) began an effort on two fronts 
to contest what they perceived to be unattainable and unreasonable standards. The 
Conferences first met with Attorney General Eric Holder in July 2011 to address 
their concerns.13 In that meeting, the Conferences explained the federalism 
implications stemming from this new federal mandate and asked the Attorney 
General to encourage his staff to work with the Conferences to explore strategies 
for implementation of Title VI to achieve the shared goal of access to justice.  
The Conferences next turned their attention to developments initiated within 
the American Bar Association (ABA) shortly after DOJ issued its “meaningful 
access” interpretation in 2010. In response to DOJ’s correspondence to state 
supreme courts, the ABA began the process of developing and promulgating 
Standards for Language Access in State Courts, which standards initially tracked 
DOJ’s most recent interpretation of the “meaningful access” requirement. Fearing 
the wholesale incorporation of the federal interpretation into ABA standards, the 
Conferences quickly drafted a letter to Stephen Zack, then-president of the ABA, 
which focused on two major concerns with the proposed standards.14 First was the 
inability of state courts to meet these new federal demands absent additional 
funding. The Conferences explained that the standards as written “promot[ed] an 
access mandate that no state court in the nation [would] be able to meet,” noting 
that at the same time the federal government was demanding absolute access to 
state court interpreters—both in and out of courtroom—“state courts are 
furloughing staff, shuttering courthouses, and sometimes requiring litigants to 
bring their own paper for copies.”15 Thus, absent significant additional funding, the 
Conferences lamented that compliance with the new mandate would require 
“cannibalizing other critical programs in such areas as domestic violence, juvenile 
justice, information technology, and problem-solving courts.”16 The Conferences 
proposed that in light of limited state resources, the standards should focus on 
                                                     
12 Id. at 2–3. 
13 See Limited English Proficiency, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc 
.org/Services-and-Experts/Government-Relations/Access-to-Justice/Limited-English-Profic 
iency.aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
14 Letter from Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court Adm’rs to 
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applying those resources to “improv[e] access to justice for those least able to 
afford it,” by “focusing on the immediate concerns of citizens who are indigent.”17 
The second major concern addressed by the Conferences was that the 
standards promoted a level of access on the part of state courts that “appear[ed] 
inapplicable to either the federal courts or the many administrative agencies 
throughout government that have adjudicatory authority.”18 In other words, while 
compliance with the standards was mandatory for state courts, they appeared to be 
merely suggested “best practices” for their federal counterparts. As it concerns 
federalism principles, this double standard was perhaps the most troubling aspect 
of ABA’s proposed access standards. 
The Conferences closed by reaffirming their shared commitment of equal 
access to the courts, but pointed out that the ABA’s standards failed to account for 
the practical realities courts encounter. Without properly addressing these realities, 
the Conferences feared that the proposed standards would fail to garner “the broad-
based legitimacy necessary to effectuate their goals,” and the Conferences 
therefore refused to support them.19  
The Conferences’ firm stance on the proposed ABA standards continued 
through the end of 2010. Conference leaders made an appearance at the 2010 ABA 
annual meeting and again expressed their concerns with the proposed ABA 
Language Access Standards. As a result of these efforts, the standards were pulled 
from the ABA House of Delegates’ agenda.20 In lieu of voting on the proposed 
standards, the ABA appointed a working group consisting of the Conferences, the 
ABA, and the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) to negotiate revised 
standards that adequately addressed the Conferences’ budgetary and federalism 
concerns. Those negotiations proved successful, and on February 6, 2012, the 
working group’s revised standards were adopted by the ABA in its 2012 Midyear 
Meeting.21 The Conferences’ success with the ABA provides an excellent example 
of how state court leadership can collaborate to ensure that states’ interests are 
protected against federal efforts to dictate matters of local concern. 
Notwithstanding this outcome in the ABA, however, federal enforcement of the 
LEP mandate continues against state courts in accordance with federal 
interpretation of Title VI.  
 
III.  DOJ ENFORCEMENT OF LEP MANDATE AGAINST STATE JUDICIARIES 
 
Title VI’s implementing regulations authorize DOJ to engage in various 
procedures to monitor and secure state judiciaries’ compliance with Title VI. As a 
                                                     
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Id. 
20 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 13.  
21 See AM. BAR ASS’N, Foreword to STANDARDS FOR LANGUAGE ACCESS IN COURTS 
(2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid 
_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_standards_for_language_access_proposal.authcheckdam.pd
f. 
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threshold matter, federal regulations now require every state judiciary’s application 
for federal financial assistance to include an assurance that the state judiciary will 
comply with DOJ’s directives regarding LEP access to the courts.22 After federal 
assistance is granted, DOJ is further authorized to monitor state judiciaries by 
investigating any complaints alleging that a state judiciary is not complying with 
Title VI and its implementing regulations.23 In that event, DOJ is authorized to 
issue findings regarding the results of that investigation.24 If it discovers that the 
state judiciary is not in compliance with federal mandates, DOJ may then negotiate 
and secure the state’s voluntary compliance if possible.25 However, if DOJ is 
unable to obtain voluntary compliance, it is then authorized to pursue one or both 
of two options: (1) suspend or terminate financial assistance to the state judicial 
branch, or (2) bring a civil suit to enforce the federal mandate.26 
Since the Executive Order’s issuance in 2000, DOJ has utilized its 
investigatory authority to conduct at least four investigations of state judiciaries 
(Colorado, Maine, North Carolina, and Michigan) for alleged failure to provide 
LEP individuals with “meaningful access” to state court services. This Essay will 
focus on the investigations of North Carolina and Michigan, as they are 
particularly relevant in demonstrating the types of federal demands being made of 
state courts, and how DOJ interprets its authority under federal law.27  
 
A.  DOJ Investigation of North Carolina 
 
In 2006, North Carolina’s legislature authorized the judiciary’s 
Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) to prescribe mandatory policies for 
appointing and paying for foreign-language interpreters.28 To comply with this 
legislative authorization, the AOC published a guidance document regarding the 
same.29 Shortly thereafter, however, DOJ’s Civil Rights Division received a 
complaint that the document failed to provide meaningful access to LEP 
individuals.30 DOJ swiftly initiated an investigation into this complaint and issued 
                                                     
22 See 28 C.F.R. § 42.105 (2012).  
23 Id. § 42.107. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 Id. § 42.108(a).  
27 The other two investigations (of Colorado and Maine) resulted in Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOAs) between DOJ and the respective states. The MOAs are essentially 
a product of each state’s voluntary acquiescence to DOJ’s interpretation of Title VI and 
appurtenant demands.  
28 See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
John W. Smith, Dir. of N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts (Mar. 8, 2012), available at http: 
//www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/TitleVI/030812_DOJ_Letter_to_NC_AOC.pdf. 
29 Id. at 5. 
30 Id. In addition to interpreter-specific complaints regarding the professionalism of 
the services provided, the complaint specifically alleged that the AOC does not provide 
interpreters for LEP Spanish speakers facing eviction. Another complaint was also filed in 
2011, alleging that the North Carolina Judicial Branch was in violation of Title VI by 
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findings that North Carolina’s policies and practices discriminated on the basis of 
national origin, in violation of federal law, by failing to provide LEP individuals 
with meaningful access to state court proceedings and operations.31  
First, DOJ strenuously encouraged voluntary compliance and attempted to 
preempt North Carolina’s concerns about fiscal pressures by declaring that strict 
adherence to federal guidelines was required despite financial constraints because 
such constraints “are not a blanket exemption from civil rights requirements.”32 
Second, DOJ asserted that “federal law preempts the state law provisions . . . as a 
barrier to compliance.”33 Citing Supreme Court precedent, DOJ asserted that 
implementing regulations under federal laws such as Title VI preempt any 
inconsistent state-law obligations.34 Third, DOJ threatened that if North Carolina 
did not voluntarily comply, “the United States [would] take appropriate 
enforcement action” including civil litigation, administrative procedures for 
injunctive relief, and “recovery, suspension, or termination of federal funding.”35 
Finally, as an additional compliance incentive, DOJ noted that North Carolina’s 
court system received federal assistance from other federal agencies (e.g., the 
Department of Health and Human Services) and because those agencies also had 
power to revoke their respective funding under Title VI, DOJ would be forwarding 
its report of findings to those agencies as well.36  
A reading of DOJ’s report makes clear that the dispute between the AOC’s 
policy guidance and DOJ’s interpretation of the federal “meaningful access” 
standard was simply one of degree. The AOC’s policy guidance reflected the state 
judiciary’s judgment about how best to provide for LEP access to the courts in 
light of budgetary constraints. DOJ’s standard, by contrast, was much more 
expansive. DOJ described it as the controlling interpretation to be applied across 
the board without due regard to competing obligations or budgetary constraints.  
                                                     
intentionally refusing to provide free interpreters to LEP individuals litigating or 
attempting to litigate civil claims. The scope of the investigation was later revised to 
include these claims. 
31 Id. at 1. 
32 Id. at 2. While it is true that state budgetary constraints do not provide a “blanket 
exemption” from civil rights requirements, they are clearly a valid and appropriate 
consideration when determining the reasonableness of a state’s steps toward meaningful 
access. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. However, the tone of this letter suggests 
that a state’s incorporation of fiscal pressures into the calculus of “meaningful access” will 
be frowned upon and cannot serve as a basis for failing to meet whatever federal standard 
DOJ decides to impose.  
33 Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant U.S. Attorney Gen., to John Smith, Dir. of 
N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, at 3 (Mar. 8, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
crt/about/cor/TitleVI/030812_DOJ_Letter_to_NC_AOC.pdf. 
34 Id. at 9. Conspicuously absent, however, were any citations to precedent holding 
that an agency’s interpretation of such regulations, like DOJ’s LEP mandate here, is 
entitled to the same preemptive power. 
35 Id. at 3–4. 
36 Id. at 4. 
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While DOJ’s interpretation certainly incorporates laudable goals, its goals are 
unattainable for many court systems in light of current limited state resources. 
DOJ’s insistence on a standard that many court systems cannot meet, along with its 
threats of defunding and civil litigation, create serious questions regarding the 
legality of its approach in light of well-established principles of federalism. 
Specifically, it is debatable whether Title VI and its regulations actually authorize 
DOJ to force state judiciaries to allocate their resources in a particular way in order 
to satisfy its expansive interpretation of Title VI and its regulations. Equally 
debatable is whether the federal government can enforce these standards through 
civil litigation if state judiciaries disagree. The following section discusses DOJ’s 
investigation of Michigan’s courts and Michigan’s response. It focuses particularly 
on Michigan Supreme Court Justice Stephen Markman’s dissent to Michigan’s 
new LEP rules, and discusses how state-court resistance through defensive 
litigation could prove to be an effective way to delineate the contours of federalism 
in this arena. 
 
B.  Michigan’s Response to DOJ Investigation 
 
As in North Carolina, Michigan’s court system was the subject of a DOJ 
investigation after the Civil Rights Division of DOJ received a complaint. Before 
the investigation, Michigan provided interpreters for all criminal defendants who 
needed them, and the courts retained discretion to appoint interpreters in civil 
cases.37 These policies had been in place long before Assistant Attorney General 
Thomas Perez issued his August 2010 letter clarifying the “meaningful access” 
standard for state courts, and by all measures Michigan’s interpreter program had 
provided well for Michigan’s LEP population.38  
However, after receiving DOJ’s August 2010 letter, the Michigan Supreme 
Court “convened a steering committee of judges and court administrators to 
develop proposals addressing access to court services for LEP individuals.”39 To 
aid in developing new court rules, the Michigan Supreme Court sought input from 
DOJ, “sharing [with it] numerous versions of the proposed court rules, exchanging 
ideas for the hiring and training of interpreters, and devising new and innovative 
ways to provide interpreter services at low or reduced costs.”40 In the end, 
Michigan promulgated new state court rules that significantly expanded the 
Court’s LEP program, but did not adopt DOJ guidelines wholesale.41 The new 
rules focus on providing free interpreter services to the “truly needy” while giving 
                                                     
37 Michigan Supreme Court Order, ADM File No. 2012-03, at 17 (Sept. 11, 2013), 
available at http://courts.mi.gov/Courts/MichiganSupremeCourt/rules/court-rules-admin-m 
atters/Adopted/2012-03_2013-09-11_formatted.pdf. 
38 Id. Indeed, Michigan Supreme Court Justice Stephen Markman noted that in his 
experience on the court over the preceding fourteen years, he could not “recall a single case 
in which an LEP person alleged that he or she had been denied an interpreter.” Id. 
39 Id. at 1. 
40 Id. 
41 See generally id. 
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trial judges the discretion to require reimbursement for such services from 
nonindigent LEP individuals.42 The new rules were adopted to “strike the balance 
between ensuring meaningful access while not imposing undue burdens on 
Michigan’s local courts.”43 In doing so, these narrower rules were fashioned in 
“frank acknowledgment that [Michigan’s] trial courts—and indeed, [Michigan’s] 
economy—are under severe financial stress and cannot, without explicit legal 
authority, be required to provide, at taxpayer expense, interpreter services for all 
LEP persons regardless of their means.”44 
While all of the other Michigan Supreme Court Justices concurred in these 
new rules, Justice Stephen Markman wrote a strong dissent, taking issue with the 
staggering scope of DOJ’s demands,45 the coercive nature of its threat to eliminate 
federal funding if the state refused to voluntarily comply, and the “flimsiness of the 
legal support” justifying DOJ’s assertion that states would be in violation of U.S. 
law by failing to adopt in toto its LEP rules.46 Part II addressed the expansive 
scope of DOJ’s demands, but the issues of federal coercion and the legal basis 
underlying DOJ’s demands are worth exploring in greater depth below.  
 
1.  Legal Basis Underlying DOJ Mandates 
 
DOJ traces its authority to impose federal LEP mandates to Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.47 But the gap between this federal statute and DOJ’s 
ultimate demands is quite large. Indeed, the actual language of the statute must 
first pass through several layers of interpretation before it reaches DOJ’s detailed 
and comprehensive LEP mandates. As Justice Markman aptly points out, DOJ’s 
demands  
                                                     
42 Id. at 1. The new rules require the appointment at public expense of interpreters in 
all court proceedings, including both criminal and civil cases, for all parties and witnesses 
who need one in order to meaningfully participate in court proceedings. MCR 1.111(B)(1). 
The rules then allow, but do not require, the court to order financially able parties to 
reimburse the court at the conclusion of trial. MCR 1.111(F)(5). Regarding the ability to 
reimburse the court, the Michigan Supreme Court stated, 
 
In determining whether a party has the ability to reimburse for interpreter 
services, the court will impose costs only if the party has income above 125% of 
the federal poverty level and the court finds assessment of the interpreter costs 
would not unreasonably impede the person’s ability to pursue or defend a claim. 
 
Michigan Supreme Court Order, supra note 37, at 2.  
43 Id. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 12–20. As Justice Markman points out, the scope of DOJ’s demands would 
extend LEP benefits to “almost any individual having virtually any interaction with any 
court-related proceeding or program, and they would require the courts to provide these 
individuals with free interpreters regardless of their ability to pay.” Id. at 13. 
46 Id. at 14. 
47 Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121 (Aug 11, 2000). 
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rel[y] upon a letter from the Assistant Attorney General placing a new 
gloss upon a non-binding statement of “policy guidance” previously 
issued by the [DOJ]. That “policy guidance” in turn is ostensibly based 
upon the [DOJ’s] own regulations, which are in turn based upon Title 
VI, the only authority in this listing that is an actual statute of the United 
States.48  
 
In addition to the attenuated line of legal authority supporting DOJ’s 
demands, the constitutionality of at least one federal regulation upon which DOJ 
relies has previously been called into question.49 That regulation prohibits federal 
fund recipients from implementing programs that have a disparate impact on racial 
or ethnic minorities, apparently without regard to whether the disparate impact is a 
product of intentional discrimination.50 Justice Markman describes how the 
Michigan investigation demonstrates that DOJ appears to be “ground[ing] its 
efforts to compel state supreme courts to adopt its preferred LEP court rules 
exclusively in ‘disparate impact’ analysis.”51 These efforts are misguided, 
however, given that U.S. Supreme Court precedent clearly dictates that Title VI, 
like the federal constitution, prohibits only intentional discrimination.52 Because 
DOJ’s findings in Michigan and in other states have not connected the alleged 
disparate impact of state LEP programs to intentional efforts on the part of states to 
discriminate, DOJ arguably lacks legal authority for compelling state courts to 
adopt its expansive rules. As a result, “[g]iven that Title VI nowhere requires or 
implies the free appointment of interpreters,” Justice Markman argues DOJ’s claim 
that “Title VI provides it with the legal authority to compel state adoption of its 





                                                     
48 Michigan Supreme Court Order, supra note 37, at 15. 
49 See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 278, 281–82 (2001) (calling into 
question the propriety of 28 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(2), which forbids recipients of federal funds 
from “utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting 
individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin . . . .”). The 
Alexander case noted that regulations “proscrib[ing] activities that have a disparate impact 
on racial groups, even though such activities are permissible under [Title VI] . . . are in 
considerable tension with the rule of [Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978)] and [Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)] that [Title VI] 
forbids only intentional discrimination . . . .” Id. at 281–82. 
50 See 28 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(2) (2000). 
51 Michigan Supreme Court Order, supra note 37, at 16. 
52 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284–87; see also Alexander, 
532 U.S. at 285 (2001) (“It is clear now that the disparate-impact regulations do not simply 
apply [Title VI]—since they indeed forbid conduct that [Title VI] permits.”).  
53 Michigan Supreme Court Order, supra note 37, at 17. 
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2.  Federal Coercion by Threat of Defunding and Civil Litigation 
 
In its collaboration with Michigan’s steering committee, DOJ informed the 
Michigan Supreme Court that compliance with its demands was a condition of the 
court system receiving “federal financial assistance.”54 But because Michigan’s 
court system, like many state judiciaries, receives federal funds from multiple 
federal agencies, both directly and indirectly (as subrecipients of federal grants), 
DOJ’s threat did not make clear whether failure to comply in toto with DOJ’s LEP 
demands would cut off only DOJ’s funding or all federal assistance, whatever the 
source.55 In Justice Markman’s view, this vague reference to federal financial 
assistance was likely used intentionally as a “more effective ‘negotiating’ strategy 
to allow a state to stew in uncertainty concerning the financial stakes involved 
should it fail” to acquiesce entirely to DOJ’s demands.56  
It seems unlikely that DOJ would have the legal authority to deprive a state 
judiciary of all federal funding merely for a state’s partial noncompliance with 
DOJ’s extraordinarily far-reaching LEP demands.57 Of course, while the federal 
government may permissibly condition financial assistance on state compliance 
with federal guidelines, there comes a point “in some circumstances [when] 
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point 
at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”58 “When, for example, such conditions 
take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent grants, the 
conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy 
changes.”59As a result, Justice Markman notes,  
 
It is hardly self-evident that the [U.S. Supreme] Court would look . . . 
favorably upon a threat directed toward the Michigan court system 
focused upon the loss of 100% of its federal financial assistance, almost 
all of which has little or nothing to do with the matter in dispute.60 
 
3.  Justice Markman’s Proposed Solution 
 
Given the potential legal infirmities of DOJ’s demands, coupled with the lack 
of evidence that Michigan’s existing programs were failing to provide meaningful 
access to LEP individuals, Justice Markman dissented to the new rules, primarily 
                                                     
54 Id. at 12. 
55 Federal financial assistance to Michigan’s court system is $108.6 million, not 
including grants paid directly to local courts. Id. at 13. In another letter to the Michigan 
Supreme Court, however, DOJ referenced only a $1.5 million program as triggering LEP 
requirements. Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See id.  
58 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
59 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012). 
60 Michigan Supreme Court Order, supra note 37, at 14. 
924 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
 
on the basis that they were the product of federal coercion rather than “of any 
exercise of independent judgment by the courts themselves that such rules are 
warranted.”61 Justice Markman viewed the LEP issue as just one instance in an 
“increasingly familiar pattern by which . . . state supreme courts have routinely 
been ‘commandeered’ or ‘dragooned’ by federal agencies to enact new court 
rules . . . as the product of financial threats.”62 And especially troubling is the fact 
that “[t]hese demands typically occur in areas of policy that lie within the core 
constitutional responsibility of the states . . . and where there is little or no federal 
authority that can be discerned from the Constitution.”63 Thus, while sensitive to 
the need to provide all individuals with meaningful access to the courts, Justice 
Markman dissented on federalism grounds, out of concern for the way in which the 
Michigan judges, as “elected representatives of the people[,] become little more 
than mechanical instrumentalities for obediently carrying out the demands of 
federal officials.”64 
Instead of adopting new court rules under pressure from DOJ, Justice 
Markman argued that Michigan should stand its ground and inform the Assistant 
Attorney General that, in the judgment of the court, the existing rules have 
operated fairly and effectively to provide LEP individuals with meaningful access 
to the state court system.65 If DOJ then decided to carry out its implicit threats to 
sue the state, it would be a welcome opportunity for Michigan to assert its 
constitutional prerogatives in federal court.66 Justice Markman posited that 
defending against such suits would give states the opportunity to ensure that the 
burden of proof rests squarely on DOJ to demonstrate the soundness of the legal 
position underlying its LEP mandates.67 He also noted that the state supreme courts 
are in the best position to assert the constitutional prerogatives of their individual 
states, “both in asserting the rule of law and in delineating the contours of 
American federalism.”68 As a result, Justice Markman opposed the adoption of the 
new rules, not because he disagreed with their substance, but because they 
represented the product of federal coercion rather than the state’s own deliberation 
and judgment.69 He feared that by accepting some, but not all, of DOJ’s demands, 
the potential ensuing lawsuit by DOJ would focus more on the details that divide 
DOJ and the Michigan Supreme Court, rather than on the larger and more 
important federalism concerns.70 
                                                     
61 Id. at 19. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 20. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 19–20. 
67 Id. at 19 n.11. 
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 19–20. 
70 Id. 
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DOJ responded six days after the Michigan Supreme Court issued its order 
regarding the new rules.71 In a letter to the court, DOJ expressed “grave concerns” 
that the new rules would result in national-origin discrimination.72 But this time, 
rather than threatening legal action, DOJ simply noted that its “investigation of the 
Michigan state courts continues.”73 It described its successes in working with other 
state court systems in implementing its guidelines and concluded by expressing 
confidence that “working together, the same results can be achieved in 
Michigan.”74 The tone of DOJ’s letter suggests that Michigan’s response—and 
particularly Justice Markman’s dissent—may have encouraged DOJ to tread more 
lightly with respect to its demands. Though more confrontational, the stance 
proposed by Justice Markman may turn out to be a viable strategy for state courts 
across the country to adopt in order to assert the proper balance of power inherent 
in federalism.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
State courts have a well-recognized obligation to provide LEP individuals 
with meaningful access. In accordance with federal law, state courts have long 
been taking steps to increase that access, though perhaps not with time frames as 
swift as DOJ (or even the courts themselves) would prefer. But determining the 
manner in which state courts allocate their resources to provide interpreters should 
be within the discretion of the states to decide, provided, of course, that the courts 
provide meaningful access to LEP individuals. Additionally, state courts must 
make LEP funding decisions in a holistic context that requires courts to allocate 
scarce resources across multiple important considerations, only one of which is the 
provision of free court interpreters for LEP individuals. These realities were 
acknowledged in federal Title VI interpretive guidance that contemplates a 
balanced approach in focusing on whether a state’s steps to increase LEP access 
are “reasonable.” DOJ has taken this guidance a step further, construing Title VI’s 
requirements to include free access to court interpreters across a breathtakingly 
expansive range of court services, and regardless of an LEP individual’s ability to 
pay for an interpreter. 
It is unlikely, however, that a federal agency acts pursuant to its authority 
within our constitutional architecture when it seeks to require the courts of every 
state to adopt court rules imposing considerable new financial costs upon their 
citizens, which rules are predicated on “letter interpretations” grounded in 
statements of “policy guidance” based on administrative regulations purporting to 
interpret congressional statutes. 
                                                     
71 Letter from Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, et 
al., to Matthew Schneider, Chief Legal Counsel, Mich. Dep’t of Att’y Gen. (Sept. 17, 
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/mie/downloads/091713_AAG_Letter_to_ 
MI_Re_Court_Rule%20(2).pdf.  
72 Id. at 1. 
73 Id. at 3. 
74 Id.  
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It seems equally unlikely that DOJ possesses the constitutional authority to 
deprive a state court system of the entirety of its federal financial assistance simply 
because the state does not fully assent to the conditions imposed by DOJ pertaining 
to LEP services. Indeed, the “financial inducement” DOJ has chosen in this 
circumstance is much less akin to “relatively mild encouragement” than it is to a 
“gun to the head.”75 While it is clear that the federal spending authority includes 
the authority to attach conditions to the receipt of funds, this authority is not 
without limit. DOJ’s conditions in this instance may be a bridge too far. 
Thus, DOJ’s recent demands leave state court systems with a difficult choice. 
On one hand, they can simply assume the legal legitimacy of the new LEP 
mandates and try their best to implement the demands despite disagreements or 
budgetary constraints. On the other hand, state courts could place at risk at least a 
portion, and potentially all, of their federal funding and prepare to defend against 
DOJ in civil litigation by refusing to adopt the demands wholesale. The latter 
option would require courts to take a somewhat more confrontational stand, but as 
Justice Markman notes, forcing DOJ to carry the burden of proving the legal basis 
for its demands may provide a viable strategy to ensure that the proper contours of 
American federalism are preserved, and respect for state sovereignty is maintained.  
                                                     
75 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012) 
(“When . . . such conditions take the form of threats to terminate other significant 
independent grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States 
to accept policy changes. . . . [T]he financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much 
more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”); South Dakota v. 
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207, 211 (1987) (“[I]n some circumstances the financial inducement 
offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into 
compulsion. . . . [Accordingly], conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they 
are unrelated to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.” (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
